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Abstract 
The paper provides new evidence on possible structural breaks in the relationship among 
business Confidence and industrial activity in Europe in the aftermath of the recession. Possible 
interpretation is that the crisis has determined a change in the pattern of response in surveys, firms 
now incorporating a lower level of long term output. A confirmation comes from the analysis of survey 
data on capacity utilisation: we find indeed that perceived potential output or potential output growth 
has declined throughout the euro area. Results may be rather important for business cycle analysts 
and policy makers: for the former, the suggestion is to consider business survey data with particular 
care, since their interpretation has changed as a consequence of the crisis. Policy makers on the other 
hand should consider that the recession has changed long term expectations of agents, possibly 
significantly affecting transmission channels of both monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Business cycles; Business surveys; potential output growth; structural breaks 
JEL Classification: C12; C32; E23; E32 
Industrial production and confidence after the crisis: what’s going on? 
2 
1. Introduction1 
The recession has determined a dramatic fall of manufacturing activity in the Euro area. After a 
relatively fast recovery in the second part of 2009 and the first months of 2010, industrial activity 
stalled, remaining broadly stable until the first two quarters of 2011 and then declining again in the 
third quarter. On average, Euro area production levels in September 2011 were still more than ten 
percentage points below those of the previous peak. Also Confidence indicators elaborated by the 
European Commission fell during the recession to historical lows, but they recovered since spring 
2009, eventually returning in the first quarter 2011 on their pre-crisis levels. Hence, there is evidence 
that the crisis has caused a break in the relationship between Confidence indicators and activity 
(Artus, 2011; Biau and D’Elia, 2011). What may have caused the de-coupling between industrial 
activity and firms’ perceptions? A possible interpretation is that patterns of response to survey 
questions have changed as a consequence of the crisis: firms may answer having in mind a lower 
level of long term industrial output, and hence their (qualitative) replies may get better even if actual 
production is still lower than before the crisis. In other words, the fact that in some countries 
Confidence seems to overestimate the intensity of the recovery may be interpreted as an evidence of 
a long term effect of the crisis on firms’ perceptions about their own potential output. The aim of this 
paper is to better investigate this hypothesis, providing evidence on firms’ opinions about their long 
term output; these opinions are derived from the answers to the quarterly question on capacity 
utilisation. Indeed, in the standard output gap interpretation (see on this Malgarini and Paradiso, 
2011), the index of capacity utilisation derived from the EU manufacturing survey is interpreted as the 
perceived current-to-potential output ratio. Hence, at the aggregate level the production–to-capacity 
ratio may be considered as a proxy of the idea of potential output which is consistent with the current 
level of production and the reported level of capacity utilisation.  
The paper  is structured as follows: section 2 provides an analysis of the cyclical characteristics 
of both industrial production and Confidence and then section 3 investigates on evidence of possible 
breaks in the relationship among the two series; section 4 introduces our measure of potential output 
as perceived by the firms and then checks for evidence of a structural break in the series. Our results 
suggest that such a break has actually occurred in a number of Euro area countries, providing further 
evidence that the crisis has had a negative effect on potential industrial output and possibly potential 
growth in Europe. Some considerations on the results obtained and on possible research 
developments conclude the paper.  
2. The relationship among industrial activity and Confidence 
2.1 Industrial activity and confidence 
According to CEPR, the last peak in economic activity in the Euro area occurred in the first 
quarter, 2008, followed by a trough in the second quarter, 2009. During the recession, industrial 
production in the manufacturing sector fell on average by 22 percentage points; looking at the country 
of the Euro Core
2
, production fell by 24, 26.7 and 20.4 percentage points respectively in Germany, 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Gian Paolo Oneto for useful discussions on a previous version of the paper, together with the participants to both 
the CIRET/KOF/HSE-Workshop on “National Business Cycles in the Global World”, Moscow, September 15-17, 2011 and the 
Fifth Joint EU-OECD Workshop on International Developments in Business and Consumers Surveys, Bruxelles, November 17-18, 
2011. The usual disclaimers apply.  
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Italy and France; outside the Euro area, production fell by 13,6% in the Uk. Since the spring of 2009, 
industrial activity recovered, generally remaining below its pre-crisis levels. More precisely, in the Euro 
area average in September, 2011 industrial production still was more than ten points below the values 
reached at the peak of the previous cycle; it remains almost 18 points below the peak in Italy, while 
Germany is the only country in which it has returned around its pre-crisis levels. 
Manufacturing production developments are generally considered to be closely monitored by 
those of the manufacturing Confidence Indicator (CI), calculated on a monthly basis from the results of 
the Business Surveys performed by various Institutes throughout Europe in the framework of an EU-
Harmonised project (see on this Cesaroni et al., 2011). The survey asks a representative sample of 
manufacturing firms their evaluation on, among other things
3
, the current and expected level of 
demand, production and inventories. Questions are qualitative, in the sense that firms have to report 
whether the variable of interest is either considered normal (or sufficient, or stable), above normal (or 
more  than sufficient, or growing) or below normal (or less than sufficient, or decreasing). A synthetic 
measure of firms’ opinions is generally calculated in the form of the balance among the shares of 
positive and negative replies
4
. CI is then defined as the simple average of the three balances 
concerning the current level of orders and inventories (the latter entering with a negative sign) and the 
expected level of production three months ahead. In order to ensure cross-country comparability, data 
are extracted from the European Commission website 
(.http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm); they are seasonally 
adjusted using Dainties.  
In order to examine the relationship among Confidence and industrial activity, we first have to 
establish whether the business cycle features of the Confidence indicator are better related either to 
the concept of classical, deviation or growth cycle of the quantitative indicator (for a recent analysis 
referred to the Italian economy, see Bruno et al, 2011). In the first case (classical cycle), the 
Confidence indicator is to be directly related to the level of the quantitative series. When the deviation 
cycle approach is considered, Confidence is related to the cyclical component of the quantitative 
series, extracted with an appropriate filter; in the following we will use both the Hodrick-Prescott and 
the asymmetric Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass filter allowing to consider also the final period of the 
sample
5
. Finally, in the growth cycle approach, the cycle is extracted using the seasonal difference of 
(the log of) the production index. Table 1 presents cross correlations among Confidence and the 
various definition of industrial production cycle, reporting both the contemporaneous and the max 
correlation among the series. The analysis confirms that in the Euro area as a whole and in its main 
countries Confidence and industrial production are closely correlated; moreover, Confidence is 
particularly related to the cyclical component of industrial production extracted according to the growth 
cycle approach. Moreover, the cross correlation function among Confidence and productions peaks at 
lag 0; this means that statistically Confidence is a mostly coincided indicator of industrial production 
growth. However, it should be considered that industrial production data are available on average with 
a delay of 45 days, whilst Confidence is usually available some days in advance with respect to the 
end of the reference period: in this sense, Confidence may be considered as a leading indicator, with 
a lead of more than one month, with respect to the effective availability of quantitative data on 
industrial production growth.  
Figure 1 shows Confidence together with the cyclical component of industrial production 
(calculated both according to the deviation cycle and the growth cycle approach) for the period 
                                                 
3
 For the complete questionnaire, see European Commission (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/method_guides/index_en.htm.  
4
 For a review of the various methods of quantification of survey data, see for instance Pesaran and Weale (2005).  
5
 More specifically, in the application of the HP filter, according to Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we use a value of  equal to 
14,400; for the asymmetric version of the CF filter, we assume that confidence variables are stationary and that 
the low and high values of the cycle period are equal to 18 and 96.  
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January 1986-June/September 2011
6
. The cyclical components of Industrial production and 
Confidence generally show a quite similar pattern across the business cycle; looking at the most 
recent period, both Confidence and production fell abruptly from the end-2007/beginning of 2008 until 
the beginning of 2009. After that, the two series show however different patterns: industrial production 
accelerates until the summer of 2010, eventually stabilising after that; on the other hand, Confidence 
recovers at a slower pace in the first months of 2010, but continues to grow until the first quarter, 
2011. After that, it starts to weaken again, in most countries returning during the summer on the levels 
of one year before. Hence, starting from mid-2010 industrial production growth has not been as strong 
as it may have been expected on the basis of survey results; after that, Confidence has become a 
lagging – instead of a mostly coincident - indicator of the cyclical developments in industrial 
production. Looking at individual countries, a similar pattern is observed for France, the UK, and Italy. 
In Germany on the other hand the two series seems to move together even in the most recent phase. 
2.2 The cyclical chronology 
In order to gain a better understanding of the business cycles characteristics of CI vis-à-vis those 
of industrial activity, we also calculate the business cycle reference dates, using the standard Bry-
Boschan routine
7
; table 2 presents a synthesis of the results, with the number of turning points 
identified for each series, the number of turning points of industrial activity correctly identified by the 
CI, those missing and the extra cycles, together with the average lead/lag, expressed in months, of 
Confidence at turning points (the complete business cycle dating is available with the author upon 
request). Confidence emerges as a leading indicator of Industrial activity at turning points in all 
countries but the UK; the lead is equal to 4,7 months for the Euro area and is higher in Italy (4,9 
months) than in Germany (1,2) or France (2,1). Most turning points of industrial production are 
correctly gauged by the indicator, even if Confidence generally shows one or more extra cycles and in 
some cases fails to correctly track the reference cycle. In the latest recession, Confidence has 
generally been a leading indicator at the latest peak and a coincident indicator of the last trough in 
economic activity, generally occurred between the first and second quarter, 2009. After that industrial 
production is still in an expansionary phase, while the statistical procedure is able to identify a peak for 
the Confidence series in the first months of 2011, an event that should be confirmed by further 
analysis when new data will become available.  
2.3 Business cycle stylized facts 
Table 3 then provides for each country various business cycles statistics, including the average 
duration of complete cycles, expansions and contractions, their amplitude and steepness (i.e. the 
amplitude divided by the duration). The table also reports a measure of asymmetry of the fluctuations 
– the excess of cumulated movements (E) – which shows the deviation from a constant 
expansion/contraction: more precisely, a value close to zero of the indicator implies that the cyclical 
fluctuation is (almost) linear, while during an expansion a negative sign implies non-linear behaviour 
with a progressive intensification of gains (concave expansions) and a positive sign instead indicates a 
convex expansion, with a slowing down of output gains towards the end of the fluctuation. On the 
other hand, during a recession, a positive sign of E is interpreted as indicating a “convex recession”, 
where output losses are particularly intense at the beginning of the fluctuation. Conversely, a negative 
sign is an indicator of a “concave recession”, where losses are particularly intense towards the end of 
the fluctuation. In the Euro area expansionary phases for both Industrial production and Confidence 
                                                 
6
 For Italy, the period considered starts from January 1991 according to the availability of industrial production data 
7
 Similar results are also obtained with the Harding-Pagan method.  
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have been longer and ampler than recessions, while the latter are generally steeper than the former. 
Both industrial production and Confidence show the tendency to a progressive intensification of gains 
during an expansion (negative sign of the Excess expansion indicator) and of particularly intense 
losses at the beginning of a recession (positive sign of the Excess recession indicator).  
All in all, cyclical analysis confirms that industrial production and Confidence are closely related, 
even if in some cases the Confidence indicator is not capable of correctly tracking industrial activity 
across the business cycle: this seems indeed to have happened during the latest recovery, when a 
substantial stabilisation of activity has been matched first by a continuous growth and only later by a 
weakening of the Confidence indicator. In other words, graphical and cyclical analysis shows a 
possible instability in the relationship among activity and Confidence, a hypothesis that can be more 
thoroughly tested with appropriate econometric techniques.  
3. A test for structural change in the Industrial production-
confidence relationship 
In this section we test for possible structural breaks in the Production/Confidence relationship. 
We follow Biau and D’Elia (2011) and estimate the following simple bridge model linking Confidence 
and activity: 
IPt =  +  IPt-i +  CIt + i CIt-i + ut (1) 
In (1) IPt is the industrial production index and CIt is the Confidence indicator, i is an appropriate 
number of lags,  and respectively are the seasonal and first difference operators and ut is a series 
of white noise residuals. Estimates are carried for the same countries as in table 1 for the period 1986-
2011 (1991-2011 for Italy); given that both industrial production growth and Confidence tend to be 
auto correlated, we choose to estimate (1) on the quarterly transformation of the original series. We 
proceed to identify the appropriate model using a general to specific strategy, considering the number 
of lags for both the dependent variable and the change in Confidence insuring that residuals are white 
noise
8
. Figure 2 presents actual and fitted values of the regression for the Euro area as whole; similar 
results emerge for individual countries (available with the author upon request). The fit of the 
regression is rather good and the residuals are indeed white noise, as confirmed by the standard 
specification tests (results of which are available with the author upon request). In order to evaluate 
the stability of the relationship, we then estimate it with recursive methods;  recursive methods have 
the advantage of not requiring a-priori identification of break date(s), as in the case of the more 
traditional Chow stability test. More precisely, we look both at the stability of recursive residuals and at 
the probability of the value of the dependent variable at time t to have come from the model estimated 
from the dataset up to t-1 (fig. 3): a probability below the 5% threshold, together with the recursive 
residuals being outside of its standard error band, is interpreted as evidence of instability in the 
Production-Confidence relationship. According to the data, the equation linking industrial production 
growth and Confidence shows clear sign of instability since mid-2008, in keeping with the chronology 
of the recession: recursive residuals fall below the .05 probability threshold both in the Euro area 
aggregate and in individual countries. Indeed, the relationship among production and Confidence 
showed sign of instability also during previous recessions in Germany, Italy and the UK, while in the 
past it has been relatively more stable for France and in the Euro area as a whole.  
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 We generally allow for four lags of both the dependent variable and the change in Confidence.  
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4. Possible interpretations of the de-coupling among 
Production and Confidence 
4.1 The qualitative nature of survey data 
Both business cycle stylized facts and structural stability analysis confirm that in the recent 
period there is evidence of a break in the Production/Confidence relationship. What is the possible 
interpretation of this result? It is just a signal of “myopic” responses on behalf of the firms, or it may 
hint to some change in the underlying long term trends in industrial activity? A more careful 
consideration of the nature of the survey questionnaire may help to shed some light on these issues. 
The three questions included in the CI respectively ask about the current level of orders and 
inventories and the expected level of output. Following Carlson and Parkin (1975), we may consider 
that the response given by the i
th
 firm about recent developments in xit (say, the ith firm’s current level 
of orders) is based on the subjective probability density function, conditional on the available 
information, it. Denote this subjective probability density function by fi(xi,t+1 | it). Let’s assume that 
the responses are constructed in the following manner: 
 if xi,t ≥ bit, respondent i assess that orders are “above normal”;  
 if xi,t ≤ -ait, respondent i assess that order are “below normal” ; 
 if −ait < xi,t < bit, respondent i assess that orders are “normal”.  
 
where xi,t = E (xi,t | it-1) and (−ait, bit) is the indifference interval for given positive values, ait and 
bit, that define perceptions on the level of the variable of interest. In other words, firms will answer that 
orders are above normal if they assess that the current level of the variable is above the individual 
threshold bit, while they will report that it is “below normal” if they consider it below the –ait threshold, 
the interval (−ait, bit) representing the values of the variable for which the firm will report normality. The 
values (−ait, bit) are usually considered to be stable over time; this in turn implies that firms consider 
constant (or, better, comprised between the constant interval −ait, bit) the “normal” level of orders. 
However, it is well possible that this interval varies over time: according to a recent analysis performed 
by Wood (2011) indeed most survey respondents (70%) change their reference “normal” levels over 
time. In this respect, in the following we would like to test the hypothesis that during the current 
recovery firms have in mind a lower normal level of orders, against the alternative that the normal 
interval is constant, or, more formally:   
H0: bi,t>2009 = bi,t<2009 and ai,t>2009 = ai,t<2009  
H1: bi,t>2009 ≠bi,t<2009 and ai,t>2009 ≠ ai,t<2009  
Unfortunately, the survey does not allow a direct estimation of the “normal” level for the variables 
of interest. However, an analysis of the data concerning the current level of capacity may provide 
interesting insight about possible changes occurred in the “normal” level considered in answering 
survey questions. 
4.2 A measure of perceived potential output 
In the literature there is ample evidence that financial crises may have a severe impact not only 
on short term activity but also on long term prospects (see for instance on this Furceri and 
Mourougane, 2009). In this section, we try to provide additional evidence on this using data on 
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capacity utilization stemming from the same European survey, expressed as a percentage of full 
capacity. Indeed, according again to the recent analysis on survey answering practices in the UK, 
more than 60% of survey respondents intend the concept of normality with reference to capacity 
levels: an analysis of the level of capacity may hence shed some light also on the related concept of 
“normality” firms have in mind answering survey questions. In the standard output gap interpretation 
(see on this Malgarini and Paradiso, 2011), capacity utilization derived from the EU manufacturing 
survey is interpreted as the ratio between the current level of output and its (perceived) potential level:   
100
t
t
t
pot
IP
cu  (2) 
Where cu=capacity utilization; IP=industrial production; pot=perceived potential output. From (2), 
we can simply derive an estimate of perceived potential output as the ratio of production to capacity 
utilization:  
100
t
t
t
cu
IP
pot
 (3) 
In other words, the production–to-capacity ratio may be considered as a proxy of the idea firms 
have in mind about their own perceived potential level of output, i.e. a measure of potential output 
consistent with the current level of production and the reported level of capacity utilization. With 
respect to the topic of discussion in section 3, if firms have in mind a lower level of “normal” output 
when they answer survey questions, they should also implicitly report a lower level of perceived 
potential output (derived as in (3)) when answering about the level of capacity utilization. We check for 
evidence of this result on the data, first of all looking at the behavior of the series over time and then 
formally testing for a change in mean perceived potential output and mean perceived potential output 
growth before and after the last recession. In this respect, figure 4 shows our measure of perceived 
potential output together with its y-o-y growth. According to our estimates, perceived potential output 
in the Euro area declines sharply during the recession, partially recovering after the trough of the 
second quarter of 2009. However, in some countries it seems to have stabilized on levels well below 
those reached during the previous cycle, and also potential growth in some countries seems lower 
than before the crisis.  
Table 4 then presents a formal test of a change in perceived potential output levels and growth 
rates after the crisis. More specifically, we consider the paired t-statistic (allowing for possible 
heteroscedasticity in the two periods) for the periods immediately before and after the peak occurred 
in 2008, first quarter, hence considering a window of 15 quarters before and after the starting point of 
the recession. We provide the result of the test for both the one tail and two tails t distribution. Results 
show that there is evidence of a negative shift in the level of perceived potential output in France, Italy 
and the UK, while perceived potential output continues to grow in Germany and in the Euro area 
average. As for potential output growth, the recession does not seem to have had a significant impact 
in the United Kingdom, while evidence is less clear cut in other countries, with  a widespread tendency 
towards a reduction of growth in the aftermath of the recession.  
5. Conclusions 
Looking at the data for industrial production and Confidence, we find that there is a sizeable 
decoupling between the two series in the aftermath of the recession. More specifically, industrial 
production, after a significant positive rebound in 2009 and the first six months of 2010, almost 
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stabilised since the summer of 2010, while Confidence Indicators continued to grow until the first 
months of 2011, eventually declining only in the most recent period. Is the decoupling merely a 
statistical feature? Or does it possibly tell us something about the long run effect of the crisis on 
industrial activity? In the paper, we have tried to interpret the break as a signal of a possible 
discontinuity in firms’ pattern of response. Indeed, if firms have in mind a lower level of long term 
output, it is well possible that they would report relatively optimistic opinions even if the underlying 
actual output growth is modest. If this is the case, the change in firms’ opinion should also emerge 
from their answers to other questions comprised in the questionnaire, most notably in that to the 
question about the level of capacity utilisation. In fact, in the standard output gap interpretation, firms 
report their level of capacity utilisation as the ratio between the actual level of production and their 
perceived level of potential output. From this simple interpretation of the survey question on capacity 
utilisation, we have hence derived a measure of “perceived” potential output and of “perceived” 
potential output growth and we have studied their evolution before and after the crisis. If the observed 
decoupling among Confidence and industrial activity is due to a decline of firms’ perceptions about 
potential output rather than to a simple “myopic” perception, we would expect a decline in our measure 
of perceived potential output or potential output growth in the aftermath of the recession. Indeed, the 
data provide first evidence in support of this hypothesis: the level of perceived potential output is found 
to be significantly below its pre-crisis level in France, Italy and the United Kingdom, while in Germany 
and in the Euro area average perceived potential output seems to have continued to grow with respect 
to its pre-crisis levels. However, in the Euro average and in Germany perceived potential output 
growth seem to have significantly declined instead as a consequence of the crisis. A possible 
interpretation of these findings is that the crisis has also determined a significant shift of firms 
perceptions about the “normal” levels of activity and their implicit assessments on their own long term 
potential output and potential output growth. This result may be rather important for business cycle 
analysts and policy makers. For the former, it tells that the crisis has determined a discontinuity in the 
pattern of response to survey questions, which may possibly biases assessments on business cycle 
situation based on survey data; for the latter, the analysis confirms that the recession has changed 
long term expectations of economic agents, with possibly significant effects on the transmission 
channels of both monetary and fiscal policies.  
References 
Artus P. (2011), “Do Leading Indicators of growth have the same significance after the crisis?”, Special 
Report, Economic Research, n. 46, May 
Biau O., A. D’Elia (2011), “ Is there a decoupling between soft and hard data? The relationship between GDP 
growth and the ESI”, paper presented at the Fifth Joint EU-OECD Workshop on International Developments in 
Business and Consumers Tendency Surveys, Bruxelles, November 17-18,  
Bruno G., Chiodini P.M., Manzi G., Martelli B., Verrecchia F., (2011), Fifty Years of Italian Sampling and 
Economic Cycle History witnessed by the Business Confidence Survey on Manufacturing Sector, paper presented at 
the Convegno Intermedio SIS 2011, Bologna, July 
Cesaroni T., Maccini M. and Malgarini M. (2011), “Business Cycle Stylised Facts and Inventory Behaviour: 
New evidence for the Euro area”, International Journal of Production Economics, n. 133 
Carlson, J. & Parkin, M. (1975), ‘Inflation Expectations’, Economica 42, 123–138. 
European Commission (2007), The Joint EU harmonised programme of business and consumers surveys - 
User Guide, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Bruxelles  
Industrial production and confidence after the crisis: what’s going on? 
9 
Furceri, D. and A. Mourougane (2009), “The Effect of Financial Crises on Potential  Output: New Empirical 
Evidence from OECD Countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 699, OECD Publishing.  
Harding, D., A.R. Pagan (2002), “Dissecting the Cycle: A Methodological investigation”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 49(2):365-381. 
Malgarini M., A. Paradiso (2010), “Measuring capacity utilisation in the Italian manufacturing sector: a 
comparison between time series and survey measures”, ISAE Working Paper n. 129 
Pesaran H., M. Weale (2005), “Survey expectations”, CESifo Working Paper No. 1599 and IEPR Working 
Paper No. 05.30. 
Ravn M. O., H. Uhlig (2002), "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of 
observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375. 
Wood J. (2011), “A Brief History of CBI Answering Practices Surveys”, paper presented at the Fifth Joint 
EU-OECD, November 2011 
Industrial production and confidence after the crisis: what’s going on? 
10 
Figure 1 Production and Confidence  
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Italy 
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Source: Eurostat; OECD, European Commission 
Figure 2 Manufacturing production in the Euro area – fitted values and actual data 
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Figure 4 One step ahead stability test 
Euro area 
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
One-Step Probability Recursive Residuals
 
Germany 
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
One-Step Probability Recursive Residuals
 
France 
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
One-Step Probability Recursive Residuals
 
 
 
 
Industrial production and confidence after the crisis: what’s going on? 
13 
Italy 
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
One-Step Probability Recursive Residuals
 
United Kingdom 
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
One-Step Probability Recursive Residuals
 
Figure 5 Perceived potential industrial output and potential output growth in the Euro area 
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Table 1 - Cross Correlations between Confidence Indicators and Industrial Production, 1985-2011 
  Level 
Christiano-
Fitzegerald 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
Seasonal 
∆ of logs 
Euro area 
 Correlation at 0 0,25 0,70 0,70 0,85 
Max correlation (lead) 0,27 (2) 0,78 (3) 0,75 (2) 0,85 (0) 
France 
 Correlation at 0 0,52 0,59 0,58 0,74 
Max correlation (lead) 0,55 (3) 0,64 (3) 0,63 (2) 0,74 (0) 
Germany   
 Correlation at 0 0,27 0,66 0,63 0,82 
Max correlation (lead) 0,28 (2) 0,74 (3) 0,68 (2) 0,82 (0) 
Italy   
 Correlation at 0 0,69 0,66 0,63 0,75 
Max correlation (lead) 0,74 (3) 0,74 (3) 0,68 (2) 0,75 (0) 
United Kingdom   
 Correlation at 0 -0,02 0,55 0,52 0,80 
Max correlation (lead) -0,02 (0) 0,65 (4) 0,56 (5) 0,80 (0) 
 
Table 2 – Business cycle chronology, 1985-2011 
    
Number of 
turning points 
Correctly 
identified 
Missing 
Extra 
turning 
points 
Average 
lead/lag 
Euro area 
Industrial 
Production 10 
        
Confidence 16 10 none 6 -4,7 
    France 
Industrial 
Production 
10 
        
Confidence 14 8 2 6 -2,1 
    Germany 
Industrial 
Production 
10 
        
Confidence 13 8 1 4 -1,8 
    Italy 
Industrial 
Production 
13 
        
Confidence 11 10 3 1 -4,9 
Uk 
Industrial 
Production 
11 
        
Confidence 11 7 2 4 7,6 
 
. 
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Table 3 – Business cycle Stylised facts, 1985-2011 
  Euro area France Germany Italy Uk 
  
Conf. 
Industrial  
Prod. 
Conf. 
Industrial  
Prod. 
Conf. 
Industrial  
Prod. 
Conf. 
Industrial  
Prod. 
Conf. 
Industrial  
Prod. 
N. of cycles (peaks) 3,0 2,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 
N. of cycles (troughs) 3,0 2,0 3,0 3,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 3,0 2,0 3,0 
Average Dur. – peaks 42,9 48,5 36,8 54,0 50,7 51,0 52,6 39,4 37,5 71,5 
Average Dur. – troughs 40,3 47,0 36,2 45,8 38,2 47,3 55,6 35,8 43,4 20,8 
Average Dur. – Rec. 19,9 13,6 15,7 23,4 28,0 16,2 23,6 17,2 22,6 50,8 
Average Dur. – Exp. 20,9 35,3 21,2 28,0 22,7 34,5 30,3 18,7 20,8 -7,9 
Amplitude – Rec. -21,9 -8,3 -29,1 -8,9 -27,5 -10,6 -29,0 -10,7 -31,0 10,5 
Amplitude – Exp. 21,0 11,6 25,2 8,9 30,3 13,4 26,5 8,8 29,2 0,0 
Steepness – Rec. -110,1 -61,1 -185,5 -38,2 -98,2 -65,3 -122,9 -62,3 -137,2 20,7 
Steepness – Exp. 100,6 33,0 118,9 31,9 133,8 38,8 87,4 47,1 140,4 0,0 
Triangle Approx. – Rec. -440,3 -195,2 -527,0 -204,5 -525,3 -250,0 -806,2 -191,7 -672,7 108,9 
Triangle Approx. – Ex. 219,2 205,1 266,3 125,0 343,8 231,2 401,9 82,1 303,7 0,0 
Excess - Recessions 21,1 13,7 31,7 8,4 17,8 14,8 32,9 10,5 28,4 -1,9 
Excess - Expansions -9,5 -5,5 -11,4 -4,1 -13,8 -6,3 -12,4 -3,9 -13,2 0,0 
 
Table 4 Potential output and potential output growth before and after the crisis 
Potential output 
  2004q2-2007q4  Averages 2008q1-2011q2 Averages t test H0: M1 ≠ M2 H0: M1>M2 
Euro area 101,8 104,4 2,7 0,01 0,00 
   France 99,6 96,9 -3,4 0,00 0,00 
   Germany 101,8 111,0 5,8 0,00 0,00 
   Italy 101,8 96,9 -3,6 0,00 0,00 
United Kingdom 99,1 96,7 -3,5 0,00 0,00 
Potential output growth 
  2004q2-2007q4  Averages 2008q1-2011q2 Averages t test H0: M1 ≠ M2 H0: M1>M2 
Euro area 2,3 -0,3 -2,2 0,05 0,02 
   France 1,2 -1,0 -1,6 0,12 0,06 
  Germany 3,5 1,0 -1,9 0,08 0,04 
   Italy 0,6 -2,5 -1,5 0,14 0,07 
United Kingdom -0,5 -1,1 -0,5 0,59 0,29 
 
